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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MIKE DRAGOS, and MILKA 
DRAGOS, his wife, 
Plaint iff s and Respondents, 
vs. 
TEDDY G. RUSSELL and MANIL-
LA RUS.SELL, his wife, 
D·efendants a,nd Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RES-PONDENTS 
ARGUMENT 
Case No. 
7895 
The original case before this Court was remanded 
for the following purpose : 
"Additional evidence should be taken to de-
termine what description is necessary to fix the 
·boundary between the lots of the parties, so that 
the new line correctly coincides with the fence 
line which is conclusively shown to be north of 
the cabins. 
"Th~ problem concerning the location of the 
sewer cannot be determined by this Court upon 
the record." 
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At the further trial the parties made the following 
stipulation as to the issues: 
"MR. METOS: I think in order to make a 
proper record, there should be a stipulation in 
the record that all of the previous testimony 
that was offered and received, including the ex-
hibits, should be considered as part of the evi-
dence so we can refer to it." (R. 33). 
Mr. Livingston, Attorney for Appellants, stated that 
the issues to be further determined by the Trial Court 
were as follows: 
"1. To know where the fence is, the fence 
has been removed; where as a matter of legal 
description, where the boundary should be fixed 
between the parties, and 
"2. The location of the sewer, that doesn't 
appear in the evidence. 
"It seems those are the two problems more 
strictly speaking. 
"THE COURT: Those are the problems." 
(R. 33). 
On March 1, 1952 during the hearing of plaintiffs 
motion to amend the findings and conclusions of law, it 
was stipulated in open court between counsel for the 
parties: 
"That the boundary 'between the property 
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants be on the 
legal boundary line beginning from the corner 
point on the sidewalk of State Street and thence 
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due ,vest 165 feet." (Line n1ore particularly de-
scribed, see .. Affidavit of Judge Baker). 
Unforttmately, the reporter 'vas not present to take 
down the stipulation, but a minute order to that effect 
was entered by the clerk (R. 74). The main reason for 
such stipulation was for the benefit of the defendants in 
that, the description now claimed by him gives to the 
plaintiffs part of their property for a distance of approx-
imately 30 or 40 feet beginning from the sidewalk on 
State Street. Furthermore, the description zig-zagged 
to the western end of the boundary line. There is no 
testimony or any evidence in the record to the effect that 
the fence line zig-zagged. All of the witnesses who testi-
fied in the case and were asked the question of whether 
or not the line was straight, all stated that the fence 
extended straight from State Street to the western 
boundary line (R. 165, 17 4, 182). 
The final judgment of the court in which this appeal 
is take~ fixes the fence line between the two properties 
from east to west so that it veers northerly to the west 
end line to the point claimed by the defendant. The 
defendants' cabins are all south of the line established by 
the court. The sewer line has been removed by the de-
fendants so that no improvement belonging to the de-
fendants is now within or on the property belonging to 
the plaintiffs. 
We believe that the statements made by the app,el-
lants in their brief at pages 8 to 10 concerning calculated 
interpelation from the tables in the Howard Chapin Ives, 
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Natural Trigonometric F'unctions, are conclusions on the 
part of the defendants. Whether the figures are correct 
or incorrect cannot be ascertained without cross-exam-
ining Mr. Ives or defendants' attorneys who wrote the 
brief. Further, the calculations appear to be immaterial. 
The files in this case were lost. It was necessary 
for the purpose of this appeal to make out new papers. 
It now app·ears that an exhibit consisting of a map pre-
pared by Art DuPaix is not in the files and exhibits now 
before the court. A copy of this exhibit will be offered 
at the time of the argument; it shows the boundary line· 
that was finally decreed by the court and from which 
decree the present appeal has been taken. 
The evidence is conclusive that the fence was on the 
boundary line for a distance of. 165 feet west from 'State 
Street to a telephone pole which is on plaintiff's land. 
Edward B. McCabe, a previous owner of defendants' 
land testified : 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
''A. 
Yes, I remember the pole, but it never meant 
anything to me. 
Was that near the fence~ 
If I remember right it is pretty hard to say, 
but I would say it was about twenty inches 
north sixteen to twenty inches north. 
How long was that pole line in there, was it 
in there the entire time you had the proper-
ty~ 
Yes." (R. 197). 
The telephone pole was not part of the fence, 
•t~ was 1 . 
No." (R. 200). 
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Hyrum Hendricks, another \Yitness for the det"l'nd-
ants stated in reference to the telephone pole: 
' 
"Q. It ":rasn't part of the fence, ""as it'? 
''A. No, it would be on the north." {R. 18:2). 
These witnesses testified in behalf of the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants have secured for themselves, by 
virtue of the judgment appealed from, everything that 
they could possibly be entitled to. All of their improve-
ments are south of the boundary line. The boundary 
is in a straight line so that future purchasers of these 
properties can identify what they are buying. It should 
be borne in mind that the fence was torn down by the 
defendants so that most of the fence line cannot be ascer-
tained, particularly west from the first telephone pole. 
The judgment is supported by ample evidence. 
We submit that the judgment and decree of the 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. G. METOS, 
Attorney for Plailntiffs 
and Respondents. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Appellarnt, 
vs. 
T. C. JAcKsoN and RuBY G. JAcKsoN, 
his wife, CHARLES E. DAVEY, and 
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name 
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and 
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7,896 
'I LED 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT NOV 1 c) 19E2 
~~---~---~--~~-~-APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT  Sllpr~;-C~~;~;U~·~ ..... L, 1 
SALT LAKE CouNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HoNORABLE WILL L. HoYT, Judge 
MILTON V. BACKMAN of 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
and 
R. S. JOHNSON 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff a;nd Appellant, 
vs. 
T. C. JAcKSON and RuBY G. JACKSON, 
his wife, CHARLES E. DAVEY, and Case No. 7,896 
JANE DoE DAVEY, whose true name 
is unknown, RALPH M. DAVEY, and 
BETH S. DAVEY, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action to quiet title in the plaintiff-
appellant (Rec. 1, 2) to named realty, in simplest form. 
As filed, it encompassed numerous defendants and parcels 
of land (Rec. 1, 2). Since this phase of the action con-
cerns only the defendants and respondents Charles ~j. 
Davey, Jane Doe Davey, Ralph M. Davey, and Beth S. 
Davey, and the unknown heirs, executors, administrators, 
and assigns, in the parcel of realty described as follows: 
Commencing 53 rods North and 181/2 rods 
East from the South quarter corner of Section 
27, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, and running thence East 11 rods; 
thence North 15.4 rods, thence West 11 rods ; 
thence South 15.4 rods to the place of beginning, 
I ~ in Salt Lake County, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
(Rec. 1, 2), no further reference to other descriptions 
and defendants mentioned in the original complaint will 
be made herein. Action was commenced by filing appel-
lant's complaint on September 18th, 1950 (Rec. 3). 
The answer and counterclaim of Ralph M. Davey and 
Beth S. Davey, his wife (defendants-respondents herein), 
claiming as successors to twenty-six twenty-sevenths of 
the interest in said property was filed August 3rd, 1951 
(Rec. 5-7), and appellant's rep_,ly to counterclaim (Rec. 
8) was filed August 31, 1951. Trial of the cause was had 
on March 26th and July 2nd, 1952 ( Rec. 1, 95), and 
decree in favor of the defendants-respondents, Davey, 
was entered on July 2nd, 1952 (Rec. 108-110), determin-
ing them to own twenty-six twenty-sevenths of the 
ground in suit, and directing that the property be sold (as 
partition was impracticable) and the sale price (after 
allowing for certain adjustments of expenses and cross 
items between the parties hereto) be divided twenty-six 
twenty-sevenths to respondents and one twenty-seventh 
to appellant (Rec. 108-110). From this decree, and denial 
of motion for new trial (Rec. 113), plaintiff-appellant 
pTosecutes this appeal (Rec. 114). 
Plaintiff appellant acquired a tax deed to the realty 
in question under date of June 7th, 1939, recorded same 
June 29th, 1939 (Rec. 13, 14, Exhibit "A"), paying 
therefore $44.33 (Rec. 14, Exhibits "A", "B"), and 
appellant paid all taxes on said realty for each of the 
years 1940 to and including 1949 (R-ec. 14, 15, 16, Ex-
hibits "C", "D"). It was-stipulated that the county 
recorder (or someone from that office) if called, would 
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testify as to the truth of the facts shown in the certi-
fied copy of the records offered as Exhibit "E "-Tax 
Sale Certificate, and it \Yas so received (Rec. 16, Ex-
hibit '"E"). Appellant testified (Rec. 17-19, 45-52), that 
he took possession of the ground by going on it in 1939, 
and at least once each year, subsequently, straightened 
up the ground, kept weeds down, and put up ''For 
Rent" signs on the ~p·roperty of the types like Exhibits 
'' G'' and '' H' ', and ''No Trespassing'' signs of similar 
kind to Exhibit ''F", and replaced the signs when they 
were down or removed. Appellant had the property 
plowed in 1949 by i\IcEwan W. Voorhees (Rec. 16, 40-41, 
53-55). Placing of the signs by appellant during years 
1945-1949 and the driving of stakes to support or hold 
them, "\vas ·witnessed by Jessie W. Lamont (Rec. 56) 
according to stipulation made as to her testimony if 
she had been called as a witness. James F. Choules and 
vvife, testifying for the respondents stated that they 
never saw any such signs, although they lived in the 
immediate vicinity (Rec. 57-64), as did William A. Can-
non also resident in the neighborhood since about 1946, 
(Rec. 64-74). Another of respondent's witnesses, Moroni 
Fox (Rec. 74-79) noticed a ''for rent'' sign on the 
property about 1948-1949, and respondent Ralph 1\ti. 
Davey, removed such a sign (Rec. 80-81) after March 
of 1949 from the property. It also appears that respond-
ent Davey knew in 1939 of the issuance of tax deed to 
the appellant (Rec. 82, 87, 91), that respondent Davey 
paid the 1939 taxes ( Rec. 84, 87, Exhibit '' 4' '), and 
the 1950 and 1951 taxes (Rec. 84, Exhibits "5", "12"). 
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Other than to go by the property and stop every sixty 
days or so in the summertime (Rec. 86), except during 
the years 1942-1946 (Rec. 93), and to remove several 
loads of soil in 1950 from the lot ( Rec. 84-86), respond-
ent Davey did nothing with res:pect to the physical 
handling of the ground; although, in 1942 he had probate 
proceedings instigated in one estate (Rec. 90), and con-
cluded other probates in 1948 (Ree. 92). Until respond-
ent Davey acquired the interest of his various relatives, 
claiming as heirs of the original owners, in 1948-1949 
(Rec. 91) he claimed only a one-fifteenth interest in the 
ground in question. It also appears that appellant filed 
an action to quiet title against the same ground as here 
involved about 1941 (Rec. 42, 97), but after some sort 
of negotiations, (Proposed Exhibits "M", "N") with 
some of co-heirs with respondent Davey, whereby it was 
p·roposed that the property be sold and proceeds be di-
vided half to appellant and half to other parties, if the 
action were dismissed; such dismissal followed in 1945 
(Rec. 97), but the agreements were apparently never·for-
mally ·consummated. In 1942, appellant acquired by quit-
claim deed an undivided one twenty-seventh interest in 
the premises from an heir of one of the original owners 
(Exhibit "3 "). It was stipulated that if the county 
treasurer were called, he would testify that auditor's 
affidavits were not currently attached to the 1934 assess-
ment rolls, pursuant to which year's delinquent tax sale 
plaintiff-appellant's tax deed was issued. (Rec. 13, 94.) 
Other facts will be detailed in connection with develop-
ment of the arguments. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
POINT II 
ORDINARY USE OF OCCUPANT MAY COMPREHEND 
HOLDING LAND FOR INVESTMENT, SPECULATION, 
LEASE, RESALE, OR THE LIKE. 
These two points will be subdivided under the following 
subheadings or groupings for discussion and argument, 
(A) POSSESSION OF THE GROUND. 
(B) OCCUPANCY OF THE GROUND. 
(C) THE ORDINARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT. 
(D) ADVERSE POSSESSION REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE 
STATUTES. 
(E) PRESUMPTIONS. 
POINT III 
DOCTRINE O·F TELONIS vs. STALEY SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
POINT II 
ORDINARY USE OF OCCUPANT MAY COMPREHEND 
HOLDING LAND FOR INVESTMENT, SPECULATION, 
LEASE, RESALE, OR THE LIKE. 
(These two points are consolidated for argument under 
the several subheadings as indicated hereafter.) 
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(A) POSSESSION OF THE GROUND: 
It is patently evident, and not controverted (Rec. 
17-19, 45-52) that appellant took possession of the 
ground in question under claim of right pursuant to tax 
deed (Exhibit ''A"), issued on June 7, 1939, by going 
actually, and physically upon the property, shortly after 
receiving his deed, clearing up the trash and weeds, 
placing ''for rent'' and ''no trespassing'' signs thereon, 
and, that he continued such acts, and maintained an 
uninterrupted possession right on through and down 
to the time of trial, and had had the lot plowed in 1949 
fall season. No one interfered with appellant's control 
in such manner as to oust or hinder him, although by 
the .testimony of respondent and some of his witnesses, 
it appeared that they, too, did sometimes go on the 
vacant ground in question, but such were only minor 
trespasses that might hap~pen in any neighborhood upon 
vacant lots. 
(B) OCCUPANCY OF THE GROUND : 
Having taken possession of the ground, plaintiff is 
deemed an occupant. See Twiggs vs. State Board of 
Land Commissione·rs, 27 Utah 241, 75 Pacific 729, at 
page 731, where the court said: 
''Occupancy does not necessarily include resi-
dence. Webster defines 'occupancy' as the 'act 
of taking or holding possession'; and an 'occu-
pant' as one who· has the actual use or possession, 
or is in possession of a thing.' In 2 Ralph. & 
Lawrence's Dictionary, 893, we find that in its 
usual sense, occupancy is when a person exercises 
physical control over the land. '' 
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From 1939 on\Yard, no one ousted appellant, no one 
brought any suits to enjoin him from performing any act 
that he performed on the land, and he continued in actual 
uninterrupted possession. There is no evidence of any 
person, including respondents, or their predecessors, who 
did or performed any act or acts sufficiently inconsistent 
with appellant's occupancy during the period 1940-1949, 
to gainsay that fact. And, as stated in 1 Jones Commen-
taries on Evidence (2nd Edition), Page 40: 
"Section 268. Possession. - Possession of 
either .realty or personalty, once proved, is pre-
sumed to continue until the contrary is shown. 
Thus it is ~proved at a given time "B" was seized 
of land. The presumption is that such seisen 
continues, and the burden is on him who alleges 
disseisin. ' ' 
Nothing contained in the transcript of the evidence 
shows :anything to indicate appellant's p·ossession was 
terminated or ousted. 
Furthermore, in the case of 'West End' Brrewing Com-
pany vs. !Osborne, 238 N.Y.S. 345, 227 Ap'p. Div. 340, the 
Court held, in determining whether or not a tax deed 
purchaser had complied with statutory requirements of 
serving notice of expiration of redemption period on an 
occupant of land, that as no notice· had been given to 
an owner maintaining an advertising sign on the ground, 
that the statutory requirements had not been met, and 
stated: 
''Actual possession is the same as pedis pos-
s~essio or pedis positio, and this means a foothold 
on the land, an actual entry, and possession in 
fact, and standing upon it as a real demonstra-
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tive act done. Churchill vs. Onerdank, 59 N.Y. 
134, 136. 'Actual possession is usually evidenced 
by occupation * * * * or by appropriate use ac-
cording to the particular locality and quality of 
the property. 48. C. J. 780. The lots were not 
vacant [referring to an advertising sign thereon] 
. . . . The location was suitable for advertising, 
and the plaintiff erected the sign and used and 
. maintained it to advertise its product. Although 
its name as owner did not appear thereon, never-
theless, its products were advertised. The use 
was an appropriate one, according to locality, 
and constitutBd actual occupancy . . . . '' 
It would seem to follow, that appellant's mainte-
nance of signs would be a further act of occupancy. 
Such minor trespasses, and the like, as committed 
by respondents, and others, strangers to the land, would 
not interrupt the possession and/or occupancy of ap-
pellant, for the rule is, as stated in W eyse vs. Biedebach, 
a California District Court of Appeal Case, 261 Pac. 
Rep. page 1086 ( 1089) : 
''The rule is well established in California, 
that the use and occup,ation requisite to a:dverse 
possession do not always require (constant' use. 
Myers v. Berven, 166 Cal. 484, 137 P. 260. It 
is enough that the property be devoted to the 
ordinary use of the occupants, and temporary 
abandonments or periods of vacancy which evince 
no intention of abandonment do not interrupt the 
. " possession . . . . 
(C) THE ORDINARY USE OF THE OCCUPANT : 
This phrase as used in the Utah Statutes [Sec. 104-
2-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-12-9, Chapter 
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58, LR\YS 1951, Page 182-3] is not further defined therein, 
and it is inherent in the wording, that the determinative 
use is to be ''fixed'' by the ''occupant'' of the ground, 
and, it can readily be seen, that, land can be put to as 
great a variety of usages, as the fertile ·brain of man-
kind can devise. Similarly worded statutes in California 
have been liberally interpreted, as shown by the follow-
ing language from Posey vs. Bay Point Realty Cont-
pany, a California Supreme Court decision, reported in 
241 Cal. 708, 7 Pac. 2d, 1020, where the court says : 
'' [3, 4] .... If but slight use can be made of 
land claimed adversely, then the requirements of 
continuous and uninterrupted occupancy are sat-
isfied, if such slight use as can be made is made 
thereof. This is the plain meaning of the clause 
''for the ordinary use of the occupant''; it means 
a use approp.riate to the location and character 
of the property, each case resting upon its own 
peculiar facts.'' 
It should furthermore be kept in mind that our 
present section .104-2-9, U.C.A. 1943 or section 104-12-9, 
Chapter 58, Session Laws 1951, has, in substantially the 
same form been on the statute books since before the 
compilation of laws of 1876. In the days of its ·original 
enactment, the landholdings, and real property questions, 
embraced the hon1e, the homestead or farm, timber, 
pasture, or agricultural ground. Even so-called "urban" 
landholdings of that period commonly included large 
enough lots or tracts to permit gardening, maintaining 
a cow, and the like. So, in viewing the sections of that 
statute, it will be found that all the modes of "usage" 
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of the occupant were those p·ertinent to a predominantly 
agricultural community life, identified with the times. 
Briefly, let us list them: 
(1) Cultivating or improving the land, 
~ 
(2) Protecting it by a substantial inclosure, 
(3) Where used for obtaining fuel, or fencing 
timber for purpose of husbandry, or for pastur-
age, or the ordinary use of the occupant, while 
uninclosed. 
( 4) Where a known farm lot has been partly im-
proved,. the portion of such farm or lot that may 
have been left uncleared or uninclosed according 
to usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same 
length of time as the parts improved .and ·culti-
vated. 
But, time marches on, and use appropriate in 1876, 
while still applicable to rural holdings, have, in urban 
areas and centers been superseded by other uses, and 
other uses appropriate to the location and ·character of 
the property and the present time. 
Now, just as the Utah Supreme Court, in Spangler 
vs. Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 Pacific 692, in -construing 
the exemption statutes, in the case of the "one horse, 
with vehicle and harness or other equipment used by a 
physician, surgeon, . . . '' as exempted by the statutes, 
to mean, in the light of later times, that when the 
horse drawn vehicle was superseded by an automobile, 
the latter would likewise come within the purview of 
the statutory exemption, so, the Court must now con-
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sider that the transition from a rural to an urban use 
area, 'vill introduce into our econon1y other uses and 
bases for holding g'round, and, the construction of the 
term ''ordinary use of the occupant'', must be made 
in a manner befitting' current conditions. 
It appears from the evidence (Rec. 35), that appel-
lant has purchased and held property at tax sales; and, 
from other cases in this Court, such as Parker vs. Ross, 
217 Pac. 2d 373, Pender vs. Bird, 224 Pac. 2d 1057. 
Pender vs. Anderson, 235 Pac. 2d 360, that app·ellant 
deals in real property and real property interests. It 
follows that as a concorqitant principle, that realty is 
now, often held, particularly in newly growing or de-
veloping areas, or in changing areas, as vacant ground, 
rather than for primary agricultural, residential, or the 
like use, and not infrequently, as an investment, rental, 
or speculative venture. 
So, it is urged, that in locations such as this, espe-
cially, since it appears that residents of the locality 
(Rec. 71) wanted the school board to add it to the school 
playground, that it would be a perfectly proper and con-
sistent use of the occupant to hold it for investment, 
resale, for rent, to whomever might buy, as one of the 
"ordinary uses" permitted to an occupant. The Court 
should therefore find that appellant's usage of the 
ground, both factually and legally, falls within the scope 
of the statutory definition. 
(D) ADVERSE POSSESSION REQUIREMENTS OF APPLICABLE 
STATUTES: 
Considering now, the several factors necessary to 
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gain title by adverse possession under a written instru-
ment, it is to be noted: 
(a) Appellant went into possession under a tax 
deed. 
(b) That ap'pellant took actual physical posses-
sion of the land and occupied the same. 
(c) That the land was used for the ordinary pur-
poses or usage of the occupant-appellant. 
(d) That the land was continuously occupied and 
claimed for seven years by the appellant 
and, that he paid all taxes during such 
1940-9 period, as required by the provi-
sions of Section 104-2-8 U.C.A. 1943, or by 
Section 104-12-8, Utah Session Laws 1951, 
Ch. 58. 
It is now elementary law that the validity of the in-
strument in writing under which appellant entered, is 
no barrier to obtaining title by adverse user, even if 
such instrument were invalid for any reason. It should 
be held that the trial court was in error, in not finding 
for .appellant on the issue of adverse possession, and, 
that ordinary use of the occupant was maintained in 
this instance and under the circumstances detailed herein. 
(E) PRESUMPTIONS: 
Counsel are not unmindful of the situation 
that might be cr~ea ted by the provisions of Sec-
tion 104-2-7, U.C.A. 1943, or 104-12-7, Ch. 58, Session 
Laws, 1951, which in the form therein set forth, or in 
the amended further form of Section 104-2-7, Chapter 
19, Session Laws, 1951, might be applied to this set of 
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facts, based on the th~ory that respondents, for the pur-
poses of suit might be presumed to have established such 
title, as would give them a theoretical possession, and 
subordinate other titles to theirs. However, a careful 
reading of the \vording in the section, and the provisions 
thereof, \vill sho\v that no benefit can be squeezed there-
from for respondents. 
Previous references to this statute in cases, seem to 
have construed it as reading: 
'' ... the person establishing THE LEGAL 
TITLE to such property, shall he presumed to 
have been possessed, etc .... " 
whereas, the statute now and always has read: 
'' . • . the person establishing A LEGAL 
TITLE, to such property, shall be presumed to 
have been possessed, etc. . .. '' 
Now, it must be conceded, from the following authorities, 
that a legal title may be based on a tax title, a title by 
adverse possession, by record title, and so forth: 
'' [3] As we have previously stated, appellee 
based his right to redeem on his tax title which 
was entirely disconnected from his judgment lien. 
Certainly, a tax title, which is prima facie valid, 
is a 'legal title', which authorizes the holder 
thereof to redeem real estate.'' -Murray vs. 
Holland, Indiana, 27 N.E. 2nd, 126. 
"[1] ... It is true that, in an action under 
this statute to quiet title, the plaintiff must have· 
both title and p~ossession, but this does not mean 
that he must have paper title to the land. It only 
means that he must be ·claiming the land under 
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such a title as would give him the right to pos-
session of it, and this character of title may rest 
on adverse possession .... '' -Turner vs. Bowens, 
Ky. 203 S.W. 749. 
'' [3] The title acquired by limitations is a 
legal title, and not an equitable title, . " 
-Houston ·Oil Company vs. Ainsworth, Texas, 
192 s.w. 614. 
"[17] The term "legal title" has no absolute 
or strict meaning . . . . It is not necessarily the 
record title for legal title may be acquired by 
possession.'' -Barnes v. Boyd, 8 Fed. Sup. 584. 
Applying the terms of the statute to our facts: If 
it is argued that respondents have any benefit from 
such statute hy virtue of the presumption, then, it may 
be answered that appellant likewise has the benefits 
of the presumptions, since he has a legal title under 
and by virtue of his tax deed. If nothing more ap-
peared, there might be a stalemate over the effects of 
such presumptions. See the parallel set out as situa-
tion (2), 1 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2nd Edi-
tion, at page 610, Section 357 on Conflicts, Relative 
Weights and Presumptions on Presumption. But, as 
between the two legal title holders, appellant was the 
one who brought the suit, not the respondent, and ap-
pellant's evidence showed him to be the more aggre~­
sive actor respecting the ground, as he had it 'plowed, 
had weeded it, put up signs, occupied, and paid the 
taxes on it, and by analogy to the situation (2) di8-
cussed in Jones on Evidence, appellant by "introducing 
some other testimony to meet his burden of proof", 
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has overcome any benefit of the presun1ption that might 
be claimed for respondents, 'vho 'vould likewise lose any 
presumption in their favor by reason of the provision 
of the same statute which says, following the mention 
of the presumption, "unless it appears that the prop-
erty has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the commencement of 
the action.'' which is truly the case here as above set out. 
POINT III 
DOCTRINE OF TELONIS vs. STALEY SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED. 
Telonis vs. St·aley, 104 Utah 537, 144 Pac. 2nd 513, 
enunciated the principal that absence of the auditor's 
affidavits from assessment rolls would invalidate the 
tax sale procedure based on sales for years with no affi-
davits on the rolls. This doctrine was bottomed on the 
theory that ( 1) No remedial legislation to relieve from 
this failure had ever been enacted, and (2) That the 
necessity of protecting the taxpayer in relying on the 
rolls, required affixation of the affidavits. 
Permit us to say, in passing, that it is not our 
intent to burden the Court herein at this junction with 
repetition of the arguments in favor of the contrary 
view, as so ably and fully expressed in Telonis v. Staley, 
in former opinion in 106 Pac. 2d 163, 99 Utah 336, and 
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Larson beginning 
at page 519 of 144 Pacific 2nd 513, as members of the 
court are as fully cognizant of them as are counsel, 
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but to point out that in addition to all the arguments 
expressed in those opinions, that our legislature by the 
successive acts of amendment to our statutes of limita-
tion relating to tax sales, Sections 104-2-5.10 and related 
sections of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah, 1943 (since declared 
unconstitutional) and in Sections 104-2-5 to 104-2.5.11, 
Chapter 19, Session Laws Utah, 1951, has been in effect, 
trying or making those remedial acts or curative acts, 
without which the court has previously held, such affi-
davits of the auditor were indispensible requisites. Fur-
thermore, it seems most anomolous to say that such 
affidavits are a necessity for the protection of the tax-
payer and his rights, and for his reliance, in order to 
set aside tax sales, and still, not to pursue the logical 
sequence of such reasoning to hold the lack of such affi-
davits make the procedure of the taxing unit absolutely 
void; yet, as in Steele vs. San Luis Obispo, 152 Cal. 785, 
93 Pac. 1020, the taxpayer was denied recovery of taxes 
in proceedings against the taxing unit. 
For these and other reasons, it is respectfully urged 
that the court reconsider its former holding, and, announce 
that it will no longer sustain attacks on tax deeds, based 
on such alleged defects as lack of auditor's affidavits on 
the assessment rolls, since it is apparent that the real 
and only purpose of such affidavits is to authenticate the 
tax r·olls in such wise as to obviate proof by witnesses 
other than the rolls themselves of their correctness, and, 
to give the treasurer a basis for proceeding to collect 
the taxes listed therein-for surely the paramount doc-
trine of protection of the public revenue, and sustaining 
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the acts of its taxing officials, when they did perform 
their duties in accordance with law, and in such manner, 
as not to cause any real prejudice to any taxpayer, 
especially where it cannot be shown that any exception 
to the lack of such affidavits 'Yas taken at the time or 
year of assessment to halt in the beginning the evil com-
plained about, should prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
IT WAS ERROR, on the part of the trial court to 
deny the plaintiff-appellant his right to have his 
title to the premises in question quieted, and, to hold 
that he was not holding such premises adversely to the 
respondents, and, that his tax title was invalid. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff and appellant prays 
this Honorable Court to reverse the holding of the trial 
court, and to remand the same for further proceedings 
in accordance with the principles set forth herein, or 
for the Supreme Court to find for appellant, and order 
recasting of the findings, conclusions, and decree directly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MLIT·ON V. BACKMAN of 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK 
and 
R. S. JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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